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Beyond the Consensus
1st Canadian Infantry Division at Agira, Sicily
24-28 July 1943
Grant N. Barry

I

n the dark of night on 24-25 July 1943
a platoon of Canadian infantry sits
quietly on the second of three Axisdominated ridges between the Sicilian
towns of Nissoria and Agira. Engines
noises break the silence of the night
as three personnel transports roll up
the highway between the towns. A
finger tightens on the trigger of a Bren
gun and bullets tear into the vehicles.
Steady fire pours from the bushes
and grenades splinter amongst the
enemy soldiers. The night briefly
returns to quiet before two more
transports grind into view and
again a finger tightens on the trigger
of a Bren gun. These Axis troops
were moving west to help stop the
Canadian advance on Agira. Existing
accounts assert that 2nd Battalion
104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment
held these ridges and defeated 1st
Canadian Infantry Brigade (1 CIB),
yet this incident casts a different light
on the situation. The 2nd Battalion
actually formed the nucleus of a
much larger force composed of many
German and Italian units, all of which
had to receive desperately needed
reinforcements during battle, after 1
CIB hammered their lines in the first
two days of the Canadian advance.
On 10 July 1943 the Allies
launched Operation Husky, the
invasion of Axis-held Sicily. Part
of a grand strategy set at the
Casablanca Conference in January,
the undertaking was designed to
erode German combat strength
and help facilitate a cross-channel
invasion of occupied France in 1944.
Included in the operation was Major-

Abstract: From 24-28 July 1943, 1st
Canadian Infantry Division attacked
Axis forces deeply entrenched on three
large ridges that stood between the
Sicilian towns of Nissoria and Agira. To
date, historians have suggested that
1st Canadian Infantry Brigade (1 CIB)
failed in its attempt to unseat a small
German delay force which guarded the
ridges and Agira. However, the area
was actually a formidable defensive
position manned by many German and
Italian units that were supported by
armour and artillery, and continuously
reinforced throughout the battle. By
destroying enemy men and equipment
and eroding morale, 1 CIB set the stage
for the capture of Agira by 2nd Canadian
Infantry Brigade.

General Guy Simonds’ 1st Canadian
Infantry Division (1 CID) which
fought through the island’s rugged
interior, unhinging the Axis’ main
line of resistance. Vital to enemy
defences, the town of Agira in central
Sicily controlled the roads and terrain
ahead of 1 CID’s eastward advance.
As the campaign began the
Canadians formed the inland left flank
of General Bernard Montgomery’s
British Eighth Army, which attacked
northward along the east coast
toward the city of Messina, adjacent
to the straits bearing the same
name.1 The British raced north to the
Catania Plains, a place historian Carlo
D’Este contends quickly became “the
most critical objective in Sicily.” A
breakthrough would leave Axis
formations “vulnerable to a double
envelopment from east and west.”2
As Germans poured into the region,
British mobility waned.
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Accordingly, 1 CID was ordered
to penetrate the mountainous interior
of central Sicily, pivot east and roll
enemy defences toward the Catania
Plains. Having already pushed 50
miles inland to Giarratana, on the
night of 14-15 July 1 CID resumed
its advance. The division moved
northwest and dispatched German
units attempting to hold transport
junctions at Grammichele, Piazza
Armerina and Valguarnera. By the
evening of 22 July the Canadians
consolidated on the lynchpin of Axis
defences in Sicily: the LeonforteAssoro massif. The Germans had
enjoyed the luxury of fighting when
and where they decided but now the
enemy “dare not retire by bounds,
nor could they risk manoeuvres;
they were obliged to fight where they
stood.”3
While 1 CID captured LeonforteAssoro Montgomery conceded that
his army could not immediately
penetrate the Catania Plains lest
he incur tremendous casualties.
On 21 July, he ordered his three
British divisions to assume an
aggressive defence while 1 CID
continued “without restraint” toward
Adrano, to break the enemy’s lateral
communications south of Mount Etna
and hurry the collapse of the entire
front. As a preliminary step, MajorGeneral Simonds ordered 1 CID to
capture Agira.4
Meanwhile, Brigadier Roy E.
Urquhart’s 231st Malta Brigade (231
MB) moved from Raddusa on 19
July to positions three miles south of
Agira. On 20 July the brigade came
41
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under Simonds’ command and was
ordered to hold until the Canadians
consolidated Leonforte-Assoro
and reached ground immediately
west of Agira. On 20-21 July the
Dorsetshire Regiment (Dorsets)
probed 2nd Battalion 34th Italian
Infantry Regiment, which guarded
Agira together with elements of
the Hermann Göring Division.
Southwest, the Devonshire Regiment
(Devons) discovered men from 15th
Regiment 29th Panzer Grenadier
Division. 5 With the terrain well
registered by enemy guns and the
town heavily defended, the British
formation needed a firm base for their
operation.
On 21 July, 3rd Canadian Infantry
Brigade (3 CIB) arrived to support 231
MB near the Dittaino River. The next
day the West Nova Scotia Regiment
(WNSR) situated itself near the town
of Libertinia. The Carleton and York
Regiment deployed over territory
from a crossing near Raddusa-Agira
Station to an area three miles north of
the dried watercourse and the Royal
42
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol19/iss2/4

Barry - Agira.indd 42

22e Régiment dug in to the south.6
Meanwhile, preparations for the
main attack continued.
As the crow flies, Agira is eight
miles from Leonforte and it was
estimated that delaying forces
might resist in between. Experience
showed the enemy preferred to
defend mountaintop towns, and
“because it was overlooked from the
high ground to west and east” the
small town of Nissoria positioned
en route seemed unsuitable.7 On 22
July, Simonds ordered 1 CIB to move
on Agira with one battalion up and
the full weight of the Royal Canadian
Artillery (RCA) in support; 231 MB
would attack simultaneously from
the south.8
The 48th Highlanders of
Canada (Highlanders) marched
north from Assoro on 22-23 July to
the intersection of Highways 121
and 117 east of Leonforte. They
unknowingly crossed the front of
a German force lying to the south
and several hours of intense combat
ensued as the Highlanders pulled

back, reorganized, and overpowered
the enemy.9 The melee forced the
postponement of the main advance
until 24 July although 231 MB
captured Points 533 and 482 astride
the road leading north to Agira.10 The
British patiently laid low and units
from 3 CIB patrolled to their south.
By late afternoon 23 July the
WNSR had destroyed German
observation posts and machine gun
nests, taking two prisoners from the
Hermann Göring Division. Later
the WNSR described suspicious
movement to their front, confirmed at
1923 hours by the Royal 22e Régiment
who “reported guns and motorized
transport going north” toward the
highway.11 As 3 CIB monitored the
movement of Axis troops, 1 CIB
readied to attack Agira from the west.
The RCA, along with British
regiments and air support, would
neutralize predetermined targets
between Nissoria and Agira. Five
field and two medium regiments
were ready to lay down shells while
a squadron of tanks from 12th
2

6/14/2010 2:50:13 PM

diary, was confident in the divisional
plan:
The feature [Agira] is deemed so
important to gain that the Battalion,
which is leading the Brigade will
be supported by the complete
Divisional Artillery, plus ninety
bombers, plus more than a hundred
fighter-bombers in close support.
It is a set piece attack, with a timed
artillery program, report lines, bells,
train whistles and all the trimmings.
The start line is three miles West of
Nissoria…Reports have been fairly
vague as to enemy dispositions, but
it is felt that the support will be so
overwhelming that resistance before
Agira will be slight.15

At 1500 hours on 24 July
Canadian and British guns targeted
the ground between Leonforte and
Agira. “C” and “D” Companies of
the RCR marched through Nissoria
behind a creeping smoke barrage.
Battalion headquarters reported
little resistance as the Saskatoon
Light Infantry (SLI) “provided some
excellent fire support during the
move through town.”16 However, at
1615 hours the RCR received a hostile
reaction as they left the relative
shelter of the town. The enemy was
dug in on a ridge code-named “Lion”
that crossed Highway 121 a half mile
to the east.
It is important here to consider
existing interpretations of this battle
Library and Archives Canada (LAC) e008300275

Canadian Armoured Regiment (Three
Rivers) would add mobile firepower.
The Royal Canadian Army Service
Corps reported that 43 trucks were
driving 25-pounder ammunition
to the front for nearly 22 hours a
day, which gives some indication
of the intensity of the fire support
planned.12 These preparations have
been well documented by historians
but the composition of enemy
forces has received a less thorough
examination.
Existing histories name 2nd
Battalion 104th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment as the key enemy on the
Agira battlefield, with 1st Battalion
15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment
defending the town itself.13 However,
intelligence showed significant
numbers of the 104th Regiment’s
1st and 3rd Battalions, those who
had barely escaped Leonforte, were
present too. By 23 July 3rd Battalion
33rd Italian Infantry Regiment
was in the area along with 2nd
Battalion 34th Regiment whom the
Dorsets had already encountered.
In addition to the many terrifying
88s the Germans had on hand,
the Italian 28th Artillery Regiment
brought 75 mm guns and 20 mm
anti-aircraft guns to bear, along with
several detachments from mortar
and anti-tank battalions.14 The main
defence nucleus was much greater
than previously acknowledged
and this, along with the area’s
harsh terrain, gave the enemy the
advantage of concentrating his forces
to maximum effect throughout the
battle. Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph
Crowe’s Royal Canadian Regiment
(RCR) soon realized this when they
led 1 CIB toward Agira on 24 July.
The RCR was hardened after
two weeks of Sicilian combat and,
as evidenced by the battalion’s war

LAC e008300292
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Top right: Italian wagons sit abandoned
by the side of a Sicilian road.
Bottom right: A Sicilian shepherd guides
his flock of goats past a knocked out
German tank.
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Captain C.H. Lithgow led “D”
Company of the RCR through a gully
behind Nissoria and up the ridge
toward a red casa 50 yards north
of Highway 121. To the southeast
“C” Company exchanged fire with
the enemy. Confusion reigned as
communications failed because the
“18 sets were out of range” and
malfunctioning in the hilly country.20
The assault disintegrated into
isolated skirmishes and LieutenantColonel Crowe sent “A” and “B”
Companies on a deep right flanking
manoeuvre at 1700 hours, which
actually brought them to the second
enemy-held ridge (“Tiger”) one mile
further east. “C” Company escaped
the gauntlet of mortar fire at “Lion”
and crept southeast to join “A” and
“B” Companies. 21 Attempting to
find the scattered battalion, Crowe
and his tactical headquarters party
clambered atop “Lion” but were cut
down by German machine guns.
Most were wounded, while Crowe
was killed.

Covered by accurate mortar
fire, a company of Grenadiers
counterattacked Captain Lithgow’s
“D” Company at the red casa, forcing
their withdrawal back to Nissoria.
With the remaining elements of
“A” Company they reorganized
and tried attacking further north
of the road but “the strength of the
enemy position was unmistakable.”22
Unable to contact the better part of
the RCR and with darkness having
fallen, Major-General Simonds
ordered the offensive maintained.
The Hastings and Prince Edward
Regiment (Hastings) attacked later
that night.
As the RCR fought, a pair of
companies from the Hampshire
Regiment of 231 MB occupied the
Campanelli feature north of Highway
121, cutting the roads from Agira
that led north to Troina and east to
Regalbuto. The rest of the battalion
lay in the hills to the southeast.23 If 1
CIB did not reach Agira before first
light the British would be forced to

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2010

and the perception that 1 CIB failed.
Historian and veteran of the battle
Kim Beattie suggested that “Lion”
was the brigade’s “most bitter and
fruitless fight in Sicily.”17 The fighting
was difficult but the efforts were
hardly fruitless. As John Strawson
indicated in The Italian Campaign,
“grinding down the Axis strength”
was the “proper strategic concept”
used by the Allies in 1943.18 It was
accomplished here with devastating
results.
Sherman tanks from the Three
Rivers supported the RCR’s “C”
Company near the edge of town.
Rugged terrain made the tanks road
bound and further advance proved
impossible on the well-registered
route; one Sherman was hit seven
times in succession. Undaunted, the
Canadian tankers returned accurate
fire and knocked out a trio of Mark
III tanks, destroyed three heavy
guns and eliminated scores of Axis
soldiers.19 The infantry continued to
fight ahead.

44
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol19/iss2/4

Barry - Agira.indd 44

4

6/14/2010 2:50:14 PM

: Beyond the Consensus 1st Canadian Infantry Division at Agira, Sicily 24-28 July 1943

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2010

withdraw from their position because
it was commanded by the town itself.
The Hastings crept through
Nissoria and onto the front just before
midnight 24-25 July. “B” Company
led the battalion up “Lion” and
accidentally stumbled into enemy
positions but the men acted quickly
by decimating forward machine gun
posts, “killing a number of Germans
and capturing others.” The Hastings
persisted as Axis artillery and mortars
screamed down for hours, but at
0540 hours 1 CIB radioed divisional
headquarters to report: “We are on
ridge east of first town unable to get
any further.”24
Twenty minutes later 231 MB
reaffirmed their hold on Campanelli
near Agira.25 Moments later radio
communications between Canadian
units failed again as numerous
machine guns stitched the Hastings
and three German tanks entered the
fray. The second-in-command, Major
A.A. Kennedy, raced to the rear to
request immediate artillery support
but the now-wounded commander,
Major John Tweedsmuir, ordered
a withdrawal as daylight revealed
his men. Behind Agira “A” and “B”
Companies of the Hampshires hid
amongst the scrub and brush on the
Campanelli feature as the rest of the
battalion retired south.
The enemy retained his grip on
the hills past Nissoria but his strength
was being rapidly depleted. Many
historians highlight the casualties
suffered by the Hastings (five officers
and 75 other ranks) as apparent
justification to describe the attack
as abortive. Yet they neglect the
Hastings’ war diary assessment that
“casualties to the enemy were greater
than those sustained by ourselves,
which considering that they were in
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
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Soldiers of the Princess Patricia’s
Canadian Light Infantry pass a Sherman
tank of the Three Rivers Regiment in
Sicily, 19 July 1943.

a commanding position, speaks well
for the determination and coolness of
our own troops.”26 Interestingly, the
attack seems to have also created a
situation where the RCR, still isolated
near the front, could inflict casualties
on the enemy.
After skirting their units past
“Lion” on the evening of 24 July,
Captains Galloway, Hodson and
Liddell of the RCR determined
that “having absolutely no
communication” with their
commander or artillery they would
hold defensive positions for the
night.27 Historian William McAndrew
laments that “ironically, the only
element lacking for a clear victory
was a clear mission for the three
companies behind the Germans.”
There was a good reason for this
state of affairs. “[T]he efficiency of a
command system is defined by the
rapidity of the flow of information,”
and in this situation communications
were crippled. 28 Instead, the RCR
took advantage of an opportunity.
As the Hastings renewed pressure
at “Lion” enemy reinforcements
moved west from Agira. Three
trucks carrying Grenadiers drove
past the RCR on “Tiger” and No.13

Platoon of “C” Company opened
fire, killing most of the passengers.
Two more trucks soon met the
same fate. Although enemy tanks
eventually forced their withdrawal,
it seems likely the platoon caused
more damage to the enemy than
the 47 casualties taken by the whole
battalion during the battle. Daniel
Dancocks claims when no one
knew what happened to the RCR
by evening it was clear their “attack
had not succeeded.” However,
No.13 Platoon’s achievement proved
otherwise.29
The Hastings’ attack also
garnered valuable intelligence.
Division confirmed at 0853 hours
25 July that two prisoners captured
during the assault belonged to the
German 2nd Light Anti-Aircraft
Battalion, elements of which were
dug in on “Lion.” According to later
intelligence summaries, two platoons
of this battalion were operating in the
vicinity of Nissoria; one with its 20
mm cannons, the other as infantry.30
Axis desperation was becoming clear.
With the delays at “Lion,”
two companies of the Hampshires
remained on the Campanelli feature
near Agira at dawn on 25 July. Though
45
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The main road through Nissoria, Highway
121, shows the effects of hard fighting
following the capture of the town.

46
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but with some consideration this
idea rings hollow. Support weapons
could not be employed due to the
terrain and radio blackout. Also, the
men were worn out after a long day
of fighting and the position grew
untenable once a German force
returned. As dawn broke on 25 July,
the enemy “were able to overlook
[the RCR] position and inflict some
casualties with mortar and machine
gun fire.” As historian Mark Zuehlke
cautions, “you can only ask so much
of even the best soldiers.”33
At 1800 hours on 25 July the
48th Highlanders set off for Monte
di Nissoria as the SLI hit the position
with thunderous fire from their 4.2inch heavy mortars. The support
group “evidently did a good job…
and inflicted a great number of
casualties” on the defenders.34 While
the Highlanders’ “A” Company
provided covering fire Major Don
Banton’s “D” Company trailed an
artillery barrage toward the rocky
shelf. If Banton reached the objective
Captain Bob Lyon’s “B” Company
would tackle a less elevated part
of the ridge to the right. The
companies would then overlook
the enemy stronghold near the red
casa.35 Moving through heavy fire
“D” Company reached the crest by

scaling numerous terraces shrouded
in tangled vegetation. Suddenly,
enfilading machine gun fire erupted
to their left.
“B” Company moved to overrun
the lethal machine guns but enemy
mortars bracketed the exposed
men. Four Mark IV tanks opened
up on the Canadians and steep
terrain prevented the Three Rivers
from answering effectively. The 1st
Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment’s
war diary reported that the ground
beyond Nissoria was “poor country
for anti-tank guns except defensively”
and Axis units took full advantage.36
Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston’s link
to 1 CIB was out, as was the artillery
forward observation officer’s radio
connection with his 25-pounders.
Incredibly, some 48th Highlanders
still reached their objective.
While “B” and “D” Companies
continued to struggle near the crest
of Monte di Nissoria, “C” Company
crashed into enemy positions closer
to the highway. Attacking right of the
earlier thrust, Captain Ian Wallace
intended on holding the ground near
the red casa. The company set out at
2300 hours on a series of meandering
goat paths. Their arrival atop “Lion”
was welcomed by the muzzles of
two Mark IV tanks which forced the

Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre ZK-860-6

initially unnoticed, enemy patrols
soon approached their positions and
by mid-afternoon had launched a
fierce counterattack supported by
artillery. The British “held on among
the vines and prickly pears until
withdrawn on the evening of the
25th.”31 Hours later they stole across
Highway 121 and regained positions
covering the north and east roads
from Agira. To the west the Canadian
assault continued.
The Canadian attack was
renewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Ian
Johnston’s 48th Highlanders. In the
late morning of 25 July daring patrols
probed the highest, northernmost
part of “Lion” known as Monte di
Nissoria. A patrol led by Captain
Ian Wallace blasted a German party
ensconced behind a boulder-strewn
ridge with automatic and rifle fire,
“killing four and returning with
valuable information.” German
tanks were dug in on the heights and
more men of 2nd Light Anti-Aircraft
Battalion were present.32
As the 48th Highlanders
patrolled, the RCR was located but
recalled to Nissoria by 1100 hours to
avoid suffering casualties from their
own artillery in the coming attack.
Some have argued that the RCR
position should have been reinforced

6
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men back below the crest. However,
brigade received a brief report that
men were on the objective “but
having a very hard time.”37 Perhaps
overestimating the size of Wallace’s
contingent, the enemy withdrew
before dawn allowing “C” Company
to dig in; they would only stay briefly.
By 0700 hours 25 July the 48th
Highlanders were winding their
way back to Nissoria. Historian

overlooking them.39 East of Agira the
Hampshires withdrew to positions
south of Highway 121.
The opening phase of the
battle for Agira is a complex and
misunderstood event. Historians are
critical of 1 CIB’s role and often refer
to this part of the assault as a defeat.
Dominick Graham, Major-General
Simonds’ biographer, scoffed that it
was a classic example of committing

“D” Company from the RCR (the
only unit to return by that time) was
checked along the northern edge
of the highway. The Highlanders
moved well north and, when blocked
on the left flank, “C” Company
advanced closer to the highway.
Together these efforts eased the way
for 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade (2
CIB).
The reconnaissance-in-force

Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre ZK-860-6

A Canadian 25-pounder near Nissoria fires at
enemy targets on the night of 27 July 1943.

Hugh Pond states that “neither
Brigade nor Divisional headquarters
would believe [“C” Company],”
and this reflects the Highlanders’
regimental history that concluded
brigade “would not put credence
in the report that the area of major
resistance around Nissoria was
clear.”38 The decision to pull back
was likely a result of the situation
along the Highlanders’ entire front,
and the enemy to the north remained
resolute.
With Monte di Nissoria protected
by German tanks and Axis guns,
which dominated most of “Lion,”
the Canadians below were stalked by
the enemy and forced to withdraw.
“C” Company did the same lest
they remain near the casa with
exposed flanks and an alert enemy
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
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troops piecemeal, while Kim Beattie
suggested that “Nissoria had beaten
each of the three battalions in turn.”
Nicholson dubbed the attack a
“reverse” and Mark Zuehlke labels
the first attempt to seize Agira an
“abject failure.”40 To date, historians
do not appreciate the formation’s role
in the battle, possibly because they
fail to see the larger context of this
effort.
Some have suggested that
Brigadier Graham’s three assaults
were identical. Pond charges that
Graham reinforced failure with
“head-on war, using bludgeons; no
finesse.”41 However, 1 CIB actually
probed several areas of the front
because enemy strength and locations
were unknown. The Hastings
attacked south of Highway 121 after

began to reveal that the area west of
Agira was the most heavily defended
ground the Canadians would take
in Sicily. Although 1 CIB could
not hold this ground, they made
vital contributions to the larger
battle by destroying enemy men and
equipment and eroding morale. They
damaged 2nd Battalion 104th Panzer
Grenadier Regiment so badly that 1st
Battalion and two companies from
6th Italian Infantry Regiment (28th
Aosta Division) were rushed south
from Nicosia on 26 July.42 Axis forces
were utterly ravaged and the enemy
would be given no quarter.
Major-General Simonds ordered
Brigadier Chris Vokes’ 2 CIB to
relieve 1 CIB and renew the attack.
Infantry and supporting arms would
be deployed in greater strength,
47
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Padre Stewar t East of the 48th
Highlanders pauses by the side of the
road near Regalbuto to have a word with
some of his men.

along with a more powerful and
concentrated barrage that doubled
the number of shells previously
fired.43 Brigade Major P.R. Bingham
stressed that “success in the attack,
depends on aggressive action, with
a very quick follow-up, both of
our own supporting fire and the
retreating enemy.” He added it was
essential to “find the Hun, hit him
and keep hitting him.”44 The enemy
could now be located more easily and
hit due to the work of 1 CIB.
On the afternoon of 26 July
Brigadier Graham recounted his
brigade’s experience beyond Nissoria
to Brigadier Vokes. The latest
information from the Highlanders
indicated that strong hostile positions
were further east than originally
thought. Graham added that artillery
concentrations did not shake the
defenders off the reverse slope
of Monte di Nissoria and enemy
machine gun posts had moved
regularly. The brigadier supported
Colonel Ian Johnston’s suggestion
that a thrust down the right flank of
the battlefield where Highway 121
cut across the ridge should provide
the best venue for success.45 Though
valuable, this information could not
prevent the enemy from reinforcing
his lines, nor could it ensure Canadian
radios would work.
As the 48th Highlanders returned
from the front on the morning of 25
48
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July 30,000 shells were already being
trucked to British and Canadian
guns. The war diary of the 3rd Field
Regiment, RCA noted: “At 1300
hours [26 July] 2 Canadian Infantry
Brigade relieved 1 Canadian Infantry
Brigade in and around Nissoria, and
plans were made for a big attack
to start at 2000 hours. Orders were
received by this regiment to dump
400 rounds per gun in preparation
for the biggest barrage yet attempted
by Divisional Artillery.” Targets were
pre-selected before but now “the
artillery plan was for two minutes
intense fire on the start line west of
Nissoria, followed by a fifteen minute
concentration, followed in turn by
sixteen 100 yard lifts at three minute
intervals.” The barrage would then
stop for 20 minutes, allowing the
second wave of the Princess Patricia’s
Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) to
pass “Lion” and advance with the
next phase of the fire plan at 2130
hours. Shelling would resume as 12
100 yard lifts rumbled east to the
reverse slope of “Tiger.”46 The fire
plan was impressive but success
depended on the infantry.
The PPCLI were ordered to
secure a firm base extending 2,300
yards past Nissoria by capturing
“Lion” then moving onto “Tiger.”
The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada
(Seaforths) would then take the
“Grizzly” line of defence closest to

Agira. Support was provided by
the 90th Anti-Tank Battery, 54th
Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, and “C”
Squadron of the Three Rivers.47 As the
two battalions fought, the brigade’s
third unit was tasked with covering
the left flank.
Since 24 July the Loyal Edmonton
Regiment (Loyal Eddies) was actively
patrolling north of Nissoria between
Highway 117 to the west and the
Nicosia-Agira roadway to the east. As
the US Seventh Army swung parallel
with 1 CID to attack Nicosia, “active
liaison was carried out between the
two forces” and a number of enemy
targets were engaged by the artillery.
On 26 July, for example, ten enemy
vehicles and a tank were destroyed
on the Nicosia-Agira road and
Canadian guns forced the surrender
of 90 Italians whom American forces
corralled. 48 Meanwhile, as 2 CIB
fought past Nissoria, 231 MB cut
Highway 121 east of Agira again.
As thousands of shells fell on
enemy lines on the evening of 26 July,
the Hampshires closed around Agira.
They gained Point 583 southeast of
town and the Campanelli feature to
the north. Unfortunately they lost
their hold at dawn and informed the
Seaforths that they “had been thrown
back off the road on the east side of
town.”49 The enemy still enjoyed free
movement about town though he
scarcely clung to the ridges further
west.
Before the PPCLI moved out
devastating artillery fire cut a milewide path through the battlefield.
The SLI joined the cacophony of the
night by hemming “Lion” with their
Vickers machine guns and blanketing
the area with high explosive from
their 4.2-inch heavy mortars. At
2017 hours 26 July “C” and “D”
Companies attacked. Once through
8
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Nissoria’s streets “D” Company was
hit by three machine guns along the
highway. By 2040 hours one machine
gun was silenced and Nos.17 and 18
Platoons reached the ridge.50
The barrage was “reported by
the infantry to be perfect” and in
front of “C” Company the claim was
well supported. On the southern
end of “Lion” “the enemy were so
demoralized by the shelling” that
15 soldiers surrendered instantly
and others were soon persuaded
by bayonet. Additionally, nine
light machine guns were found
abandoned.51 Proper consolidation
of the ridge proved taxing though.
At 2130 hours “C” and “D”
Companies requested armoured
support as enemy guns tested their
flank. The road beyond Nissoria was
not secured and the Shermans moved
forward with great difficulty. The
PPCLI’s anti-tank platoon, along with
some divisional 17-pounders, was
later moved to the ridge although
sighting the guns in the dark was
nearly impossible. As mortars and
machine guns harassed them “D”
Company dug in 300 yards from the
enemy. For “C” Company the onset
of night led to “a spirited grenade and
tommy-gun fight.”52
According to plan the artillery
paused but “A” and “B” Companies
became lost in the dark and could
not close quickly. Undaunted, “B”
Company moved along the southern
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
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flank of the highway within 400
yards of “Tiger” at 2200 hours. Ten
minutes later they gained another 100
yards and radioed that their assault
was “proceeding well,” evidently
helped by the artillery. A captured
German officer proclaimed that
during service in Poland, France,
Russia and North Africa “he had
never experienced a barrage like
that.” Axis units on “Tiger” suffered
40 percent casualties and survivors
were still groggy after the barrage
ceased. Prisoners indicated the state
of 1st and 2nd Battalions 104th Panzer
Grenadier Regiment was growing
perilous. Combat engineers from the
476th Regiment and infantry from
1st Battalion 15th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment were thrown into the line,
along with members of 93rd Italian
and 1st Sicilian Infantry Regiments.53
These forces continued to resist.
As the PPCLI’s “C” and “D”
Companies hunted for concealed
machine guns around “Lion” trouble
emerged to their rear. A company of
grenadiers and a number of Italians
attacked from Monte di Nissoria,
attempting to unseat the PPCLI.
With a high percentage of automatic
weapons the enemy harassed the rear
and flank of “D” Company as Italian
artillery officers called down shells.54
The PPCLI checked the bitter attack
and cleared the ridge, allowing Three
Rivers’ tanks to take up positions
north of Highway 121 on the reverse

slope of “Lion.” From here the
armour took “intense hostile machine
gun fire” while they provided vital
support to the infantry in the valley
below. Some optimistic radio reports
filtered back but the situation at the
front remained uncertain.
Brigadier Chris Vokes and his
staff were unsure of the PPCLI’s
exact status on either ridge but
the Seaforths were ready. Eager to
maintain momentum Vokes “decided
to commit the second battalion for
the exploitation task in the hope that
aggressive action would clear up the
situation in the PPCLI’s area.”55 Early
on 27 July Lieutenant-Colonel Bert
Hoffmeister’s Seaforths moved out,
quickly coming upon “C” and “D”
Companies of the PPCLI fighting
on “Lion.” The Seaforths moved
past at 0340 hours, pushed through
heavy machine gun fire and closed
on “Tiger” one hour later.56 When
they reached the second ridge “A”
Company was fiercely engaged by
infantry, tanks and heavy guns.
With dawn breaking on 27 July
the Seaforth’s “A” Company was
pinned down near the southern
edge the highway, unable to destroy
a trio of German tanks. They were
joined on their right flank by “B”
Company and anti-tank guns were
soon wrestled up to eliminate the
armoured threat. At 0600 hours the
Seaforths reported they were on
“Tiger” and in contact with the PPCLI
49
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The smoke in the distance marks targets being attacked on GRIZZLY by the Desert Air Force during the
battle for Agira. This photo, taken from TIGER, shows the flat-topped Monte Fronte to the right; the heights
of Agira to the right of centre; and the lower dome of Monte Crapuzza visible through the smoke to the left.
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guns as soon as they divulged their
positions by firing.” Artillery was
called down and the remains of
Axis forces encamped on the ridge
were ravaged.59 “Tiger” was firmly
in Canadian hands by 1100 hours 27
July.
The Seaforths now benefited from
an excellent view of “Grizzly,” the
final line of resistance before Agira.
Fire from small arms and the Vickers
machine guns of the SLI slashed
through the valley east of “Tiger.”
The Three Rivers quickly weighed in
and disabled four German tanks and
a considerable number of vehicles.60
The Seaforth’s artillery forward
observation officer identified targets
throughout the day and the very
accurate fire scattered the enemy in
the valley. Prisoners reported that
1st Battalion 104th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment was wiped out and 1st
Battalion 15th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment would fight to the last
man. 61 The Canadians maintained
pressure across the front including
the area north of Highway 121 where
the Loyal Eddies were fighting.
A platoon from the Loyal Eddies’
“D” Company cut the road leading
north to Nicosia on the afternoon
of 26 July. By the time “Tiger” was
consolidated on 27 July this force
had destroyed three tanks, four
vehicles and a tank conveyor. Traffic

on the road was so heavy that two
platoons from “C” Company came to
reinforce the position. Later, when the
assault on “Grizzly” began, enemy
movement on the road increased
and the Loyal Eddies knocked out
three more tanks at 1739 hours before
another four joined the fray and
forced a withdrawal.62
Most of the enemy west of
Agira on 27 July were positioned
atop two menacing features astride
Highway 121. Monte Fronte, a boxshaped plateau, 300 feet above the
surrounding terrain and 900 yards in
length, stretched south of the roadway
creating a strong left flank for the
Axis. To the north, Cemetery Hill and
Monte Crapuzza commanded both
the Nissoria and Nicosia roadways.
Lieutenant-Colonel Hoffmeister
sent “D” Company of the Seaforths
against the wooded hills north of
the highway while “A” Company
departed for Monte Fronte.63
A heavy concentration of shells
rocked “Grizzly” for 15 minutes
while two platoons of Vickers
machine guns and a platoon of 4.2inch mortars softened the enemy
before the infantry advanced at 1415
hours.64 South of the highway “A”
Company met a wave of hostile fire
but continued to press the attack.
Two troops from the Three Rivers
accompanied the infantry and caused
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but all units were progressing slowly
due to heavy machine gun fire. Still,
the battalions were grinding down
the enemy.
At sunrise on 27 July the
effectiveness of the assault became
sharply apparent. Between “Lion”
and “Tiger” enemy dead lay scattered
amongst discarded weapons,
ammunition belts and unopened
rations. Axis armour and vehicles,
smashed by artillery, were scattered
like coals from a fire. When Canadian
soldiers moved forward they passed
a Mark IV tank with “the turret
blown right off and all the rubber
burnt off the tracks and bogies.” 57
Groups of prisoners were escorted
back to Nissoria, further confirming
the success of the advance.
Brigadier Vokes did all he could
to direct the attack although broken
communications made battlefield
management challenging. Messages
were relayed to the Seaforths by “A”
and “B” Companies of the PPCLI. At
0715 hours Vokes boomed over the
radio: “Tell the Seaforth of Canada
to get cracking and you form a firm
base behind him.”58 With help from
armour and artillery the battalions
did exactly that. The Three Rivers’
tanks, now positioned between
“Lion” and “Tiger,” sat quietly at
dawn then stealthily destroyed
“enemy anti-tank guns and machine
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“great havoc among enemy machine
gun positions.” 65 However, the
enemy responded with a high rate
of fire, thus necessitating a flanking
manoeuvre by the Seaforths.
Because of Monte Fronte’s
precipitous western face Major Budge
Bell-Irving directed “A” Company
south. Terraced vineyards and
orchards were traversed by several
sunken tracks which “produced
excellent cover and allowed
immediate and rapid progress.”
No.8 Platoon closed to the base of the
hill and held the enemy’s attention.
Their shooting was so effective that
several men gained the top of the
cliff, destroyed a machine gun nest
and took two prisoners.66 The feint
held the enemy in check and at 1500
hours the rest of “A” Company hiked
southeast toward the rear of the
position.
With complete tactical surprise
“A” Company scaled the unguarded
southern end of “Grizzly.” After
establishing a foothold along a
rocky ridge that crossed the plateau
diagonally, and around a casa that
provided protective cover, Bell-Irving
reported at 1547 hours that his men
were directly overlooking the enemy.
At 1558 hours Canadian guns roared
into action and targeted the enemy at
the northern end of the plateau for 30
minutes. At 1722 hours the Seaforths

reorganized on “Grizzly” and waited
for reinforcements while resisting
enemy attacks.67 Dusk brought relief
from enemy machine gun fire but
radio communications broke and “A”
Company was left isolated.
In response to “A” Company’s last
call for reinforcements LieutenantColonel Hoffmeister ordered “B” and
“C” Companies of the Seaforths to
attack. At 1800 hours they threaded
through orchards and vineyards on
universal carriers. As the units went
forward Hoffmeister ordered the
withdrawal of “D” Company to the
north. Meanwhile, 1 CID reported
that 100 of the enemy were dead and
200 wounded; 100 Italians and 40
Germans were captured.68
When “D” Company’s attack
struggled below the enemy infested
hills commanding Highway 121
from the north, Hoffmeister knew
not to stretch his battalion thin.
“The situation became confused,
but it was clear” that the Seaforths
could not take all of “Grizzly” alone.
Accordingly, the Loyal Eddies’ “A,”
“B” and “D” Companies (minus one
platoon) passed through Seaforth
positions near the northern end of
“Grizzly” at 1900 hours.69 At 2050
hours the hills surrounding the
graveyard trembled from artillery
fire before the Loyal Eddies moved
out at 2100 hours.70 Shortly before,

however, the enemy on Monte Fronte
counterattacked the Seaforths.
As “B” and “C” Companies of
the Seaforths arrived on carriers from
the west they were bracketed with
mortars and forced to slip through
the dark on foot toward the rocky
crag. Enemy machine gun and mortar
fire pinned “B” Company in the
rolling terrain west of Monte Fronte
at 2020 hours. No.15 Platoon of “C”
Company returned fire from a small
knoll southwest of “Grizzly,” hoping
to cover the movement of No.14
Platoon to their right.71 Machine gun
fire and rough terrain slowed all
advances; “A” Company remained
isolated.
At midnight 27-28 July
a counterattack probed the area
around the casa on Monte Fronte
held by “A” Company’s Nos.8 and
9 Platoons. Mortar and machine gun
fire came down over the Seaforths.
“The company’s limited supply of
ammunition permitted only restricted
defensive fire, but the Hun quickly
shut up and went to bed.”72 The battle
along the Seaforth’s front ebbed but
action in the Loyal Eddies’ sector
exploded.
After attacking in two thrusts the
Loyal Eddies became embroiled in
fighting that continued relentlessly
until dawn on 28 July. At the northern
end of “Tiger,” “A” Company
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Sherman tanks of the Three Rivers Regiment raise clouds of dust as they move through the Dittaino River Valley.
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Just before the Loyal Eddies’
final push, part of the Seaforths’
“A” Company on Monte Fronte was
again hit by a strong mortar barrage,
heavy machine gun fire and a volley
of grenades at 0500 hours. Nos.8 and
9 Platoons led by Lieutenant Harling
displayed magnificent fortitude and
fire discipline, eventually breaking
the assault with their own hail of
grenades. Having struggled through
the night to reach them, Lieutenant
McLean and No.14 Platoon of “C”
Company arrived at 0545 hours,
just as Harling’s counterattack took
shape.75 Together they shattered the
enemy’s tenuous hold on “Grizzly”
within 15 minutes. Motorcycle
dispatch riders and engineers from
104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment’s
headquarters were found fighting as
regular infantry. A dozen prisoners
from 1st Battalion 15th Panzer
Grenadier Regiment were netted,
including “a medical orderly loaded
down with ammunition.” 76 Such
desperate measures would not stop
the Canadian advance.

LAC PA 177113

snatched the undefended Monte
Crapuzza. To the south “B” and “D”
Companies had difficulty clearing the
cemetery as the enemy replied with
mortars, heavy machine guns, riflegrenades and a wealth of small arms.
Division later reported the capture
of 20 mm anti-aircraft guns from
the 28th Artillery Regiment which
helped explain the intense fire. The
Loyal Eddies braved the onslaught
and some actually reached Agira’s
streets by 0230 hours, but the salient
was eventually pushed back and the
battle for the cemetery continued
unabated.73
By sunrise on 28 July the contest
on the steep hills degenerated into
savage hand to hand fighting. “It was
not until the enemy were engaged
with the bayonet,” says the Loyal
Eddies’ war diary, “that the situation
began to clarify itself.” While “A”
Company shot into the enemy flank
“B” and “D” Companies surged
forward between 0530 and 0600
hours.74 The defenders were routed
and the few survivors disappeared
over the hills.

The rest of the Seaforth’s “C”
and “B” Companies moved to hold
Monte Fronte and the Loyal Eddies
consolidated the cemetery. At 0850
hours “Grizzly” was in Canadian
hands and nearly all the enemy
killed. Vokes’ men had collected
over 215 prisoners since the evening
of 26 July and it was probable that
enemy wounded numbered in the
hundreds. There were over 150 dead,
even without figures from the Loyal
Eddies’ sector.77
While the Canadians pressed
the western edge of Agira, 231 MB
again seized the Campanelli feature
near town, cutting the roads north
and east. In doing so the Devons’
“C” Company noted “more Germans
were killed than were taken prisoner”
and “D” Company of the Dorsets
also achieved effective results. Their
attack was launched so quickly
that 80 Italians had no choice but to
surrender.78 With the exits cut, 2 CIB
was set to clear Agira.
Brigadier Vokes quickly
“planned an attack supported by all
available Artillery, and Mortars in
the Brigade.” At 1330 hours 28 July
a forward observation officer from
1st Field Regiment, RCA “who had
entered the town by mistake came
back and reported that he had seen no
Germans.”79 Patrols from the PPCLI
went forward to investigate and the
claim appeared accurate. “A” and
“B” Companies marched in without a
barrage but were caught by machine
guns after 300 yards. Resistance lasted
until almost 1900 hours. The majority
of the battalion was committed and
when the situation was rectified the
enemy had lost another 160 personnel
killed, wounded and captured.80 The
battle for Agira was over.
The struggle to pry the Axis
from the mountain town was
Gunners of the 7th Battery, 2nd Field
Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery,
firing their 25-pounder guns at German
positions, Nissoria, Italy, 23-28 July
1943.
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Infantry of the PPCLI patrol down the
main street of Agira following the
capture of the town.

described by war correspondent
Lionel Shapiro of the Montreal
Gazette as “the most glittering victory
of the Canadians in the Sicilian
campaign.” 81 The concentration
of Axis units entrenched east of
Nissoria necessitated the cooperation
of infantry and armour, along with an
intricate and voluminous fire-plan,
described in the war diary of 3rd
Field Regiment:
The barrage opened at 2000 hours and
was described as magnificent. The
attack was a complete success and
our infantry ended up in control of
the high ground…Enemy prisoners
captured after the attack stated that
the barrage was so terrific and our
infantry followed so closely behind
that they had had no alternative but
to lay down their arms. They were
shaken and demoralized.82

Friend and foe alike paid
additional tribute to the artillery in
particular. Brigadier A.B. Matthews,
commanding officer of 1 CID’s
artillery, declared:
Recent employment of Field and
Medium Artillery on a Divisional
basis has brought forward many
complimentary remarks for the
“Gunners” from all quarters. I would
like Commanding Officers to assure
that all ranks RCA and RA know that
their support has been timely and
effective and is greatly appreciated
by the infantry.83

A captured Italian major even
proclaimed his amazement that
25-pounders “wrought such damage
and disaster” on his unit.84 The attack
certainly left an impression on those
involved, although its effect on
historians has had a less desirable
result.
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Of 2 CIB’s part in the attack,
McAndrew wrote: “Two of its
battalions mounted a frontal assault,
while a third moved wide.”85 The
perception that 2 CIB conquered
Agira with relative ease has created
a misguided historical consensus
which suggests one brigade failed
and another succeeded. The account
presented here, by contrast, suggests
that one brigade built on the success
of the other.
Indeed the two brigades had
similar experiences in important
respects. During the whole period
24-28 July, for example, soldiers of
2 CIB and 1 CIB alike often fought
localized engagements at a numerical
disadvantage. At “Lion,” units from
1 CIB contended with far more than
2nd Battalion 104th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment, and Mark Zuehlke notes
how a reduced company of 40 Loyal
Eddies overpowered 150 of the
enemy on Cemetery Hill.86 Likewise,
during each phase of the battle
rugged terrain restricted movement
and radio communications broke
down. A single brigade was unlikely
to overcome these challenges and
reach Agira on its own, especially not
as the enemy poured reinforcements
into the front. Through a continuous
and collective effort, however, victory
was guaranteed.
The Canadian triumph at Agira,
as facts have exhibited, really was
a tactical success. It also met the
strategic goals of the Allies by

destroying significant Axis military
resources. Operationally, the fall of
Agira set in motion an unstoppable
advance against the western flank
of enemy defences surrounding the
Catania Plains. Brigadier Howard
Graham stated that the fight for this
town was one of the “key battles
in the task of relieving the British
forces, who had been attempting to
drive north along the eastern coast of
Sicily to Catania.”87 It is appropriate
to quote the commander of 1 CIB as
his formation truly played an integral
role in capturing Agira.
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